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PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AND THE KOREAN NUCLEAR
CRISIS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL LIMITATIONS ON
THE USE OF FORCE
Kelly J. Malonet
Abstract: On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush linked North Korea,
Iran and Iraq as members of an "Axis of Evil," alleging that North Korea's attempts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and
security. On September 20, 2002, the Bush Administration released its National Security
Strategy ("Strategy"). The Strategy adopted a doctrine of preemptive action that,
although recognized historically, has been significantly limited by the U.N. Charter. In
doing so, the Bush Administration has challenged traditional limits on the use of force,
attempting to adapt the concept of "imminent threat" to the danger posed by rogue states
such as North Korea. Through the Strategy, the administration asserted a right to use
unilateral military force to prevent harm to the United States or its citizens.
Preemptive action has immense emotional appeal to the American public,
particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2002. Although the primary focus of the
preemption doctrine relates to its application in Iraq, there is the potential that the Bush
Administration could use this principle to justify the use of force against North Korea.
The continued escalation of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula makes the use of
force increasingly possible.
A preemptive strike based on the presence or attempted acquisition of nuclear
weapons, however, is not justified as an exercise of the right of self-defense under
customary international law or the U.N. Charter. Moreover, the unilateral exercise of a
right to use force preemptively is in direct opposition to the collective security structure
established under the U.N. Charter. Furthermore, the use of force would undoubtedly
result in massive casualties throughout Northeast Asia. Because of the Strategy's
doubtful legality and potentially drastic consequences, a preemptive strike would not be
justified in North Korea.
1. INTRODUCTION
On October 2, 2002 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
("North Korea")t allegedly admitted to conducting a secret nuclear weapons
2development program. Such nuclear program was in violation of several
t The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor for her advice and Phyllis Malone for
her patience. This Comment reflects the world situation as of date. Any errors or omissions are the
author's own.
I At the end of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided along the 38th Parallel with the
U.S.-backed Republic of Korea ("ROK") officially established August 15, 1948 and the Soviet-backed
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") established on September 9, 1948. DON OBERDORFER,
THE Two KOREAS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 7 (1997). This Comment will refer to the DPRK as North
Korea and the ROK as South Korea, the more commonly used names for the respective nations.
2 Although the Bush Administration stated that North Korea admitted that it had a uranium
enrichment program, the North Korean government has subsequently denied making any such admission.
Instead, North Korea contends that it merely acknowledged its sovereign right to have such a program. See
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international treaties, including the 1994 Agreed Framework to Negotiate
Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula ("Agreed
Framework") between North Korea and the United States; 3 the 1992 DPRK-
Republic of Korea Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula ("Joint Declaration");4 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons ("NPT").5
In response to North Korea's alleged violation of international law,
67the Bush Administration has taken a hard-line approach.7 In his 2002 State
of the Union Address, President George W. Bush labeled North Korea as a
member of the "Axis of Evil."8  Later that year, President Bush suggested
that the United States might employ preemptive strikes to curb the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 9  North Korea's current
defiance of its treaty obligations provides an opportunity for the Bush
Administration to make a preemptive strike, but acting on this opportunity is
arguably unjustifiable.
This Comment asserts that the Bush Administration's new policy
allowing the use of force in a preemptive strike based on the acquisition or
possession of nuclear weapons violates customary international law's
"necessity" requirement under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
Furthermore, the policy does not fit within Article 51 of the U.N. Charter's
self-defense exception to the general prohibition of the "threat or use of
force" against any state.1° Lastly, the United States has not sufficiently
explored diplomatic solutions to the current crisis; it has instead refused to
Press Release, Press Conference by Permanent Mission of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Oct.
25, 2002) at http://www.un.org [hereinafter DPRK Press Conference]; North Korea's Response, N.Y.
TIM Es, Oct. 26, 2002, at A8, LEXIS, News File.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America: Agreed Framework to
Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, 34 I.L.M. 603 (1995) [hereinafter
Agreed Framework]. See David E. Sanger, North Korea Says it Has a Program on Nuclear Arms: U.S. Not
Certain it Has the Bomb-'Belligerent' Tone Noted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at Al; James Dao, The
Pact that the Koreans Flouted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at A8.
4 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Republic of Korea: Joint Declaration on Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula, 33 I.L.M. 569 (1994) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
5 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Mar. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S.
161 [hereinafter NPT].
6 In this Comment, the Bush Administration refers to that of President George W. Bush.
7 James T. Laney & Jason T. Shaplen, How to Deal With North Korea, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr.
2003, at 16, 21.
8 Bush State of the Union Address, CNN ONLINE (Jan. 29, 2002) at
http://cnn.allpolitics.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt [hereinafter 2002 State of the Union].
' U.S. Dept. of State, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002)
available at http://www.state.gov (last visited May 4, 2003) [hereinafter Strategy]; U.S. Dept. of State, U.S.
Approaches to Nonproliferation (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/9635.htm (last visited
May 4, 2003).
0 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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engage in negotiations 11 and ignored requests for a non-aggression pact by
the North Korean government.
Part II of this Comment outlines the legal justification for the use of
force in self-defense under customary international law and the U.N.
Charter. Part III summarizes the Bush Administration's recently announced
doctrine of preemptive strike and seeks to illustrate its application to the
North Korean crisis. Part IV of this Comment describes events leading to
the current standoff between the United States and North Korea. Part V
analyzes the doctrine of preemptive strike, as it would potentially apply to
the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula, concluding that the doctrine does
not meet the requirement of "necessity" under international law, nor would it
be justified as an exercise of self-defense under the U.N. Charter.' 3
1I. USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the principle of anticipatory self-defense has been
recognized throughout history, it has been significantly limited under
customary international law and the U.N. Charter. Customary international
law, 14 as expressed within the Caroline Doctrine,15 requires that anticipatory
self-defense be both necessary and proportional. Furthermore, states must
exhaust all peaceful remedies before resorting to force under customary
international law and the U.N. Charter. In addition, the use of force must fit
within the specific parameters of the U.N. Charter.
A. Customary International Law: The Caroline Case
Under customary international law, the use of force in self-defense
includes the right to protect oneself against a threat that is "imminent in
point of time," as well as the right to respond to a past attack.' 6 This rule has
been formed over the centuries by leading political thinkers and its
" Philip Shenon, White House Rejects North Korean Offer for Talks, N.Y. TIMEF, Nov. 4, 2002, ai
A 10, LEXIS, News File.
12 See Laney & Shaplan, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing the Bush Administration's insistence that
North Korea dismantle its nuclear program before even discussing security guarantees).
"3 U.N. CIARTERart. 51.
14 "Customary intemational law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES para. 102 (1987).
15 See discussion infra Part I.A (describing the Caroline Doctrine under customary international
law).
16 Roger K. Smith, The Legality of Coercive Arms Control, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 455, 479-80 (1994)
(quoting Hugo Grotius).
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application is the accepted practice of states. 17 A brief sojourn through the
history of international law confirms the validity of this rule, limiting the use
of force in self-defense prior to an actual attack. In 1625, Hugo Grotius
recognized that "self-defense is to be permitted not only after an attack has
already been suffered but also in advance, where 'the deed may be
anticipated."" 8  In 1758, Emmerich de Vattel expressed a similar view,
stating that a nation has a right to anticipate aggressive actions while at the
same time cautioning that this principle could be abused as a pretext for
aggression. 19
The modern right of anticipatory self-defense in international law has
its origins in the Caroline incident. 20 In 1837, British soldiers seized an
American ship for its alleged assistance of Canadian insurrectionists during
the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule.E
While the Caroline was in American waters, British troops boarded it, set it
on fire and sent it over Niagara Falls, killing two U.S. citizens in the
22process. When Americans made demands for compensation, the British
argued their actions were justified by "the necessity of self-defense and self-
preservation., 23
In an exchange of diplomatic notes to resolve the issue, U.S. Secretary
of State Daniel Webster stated three criteria for anticipatory self-defense
under customary international law.24 First, anticipatory self-defense should
be limited to situations where the "necessity of self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leav[es] no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. 25  Second, the force used must be proportional. Third, the
17 See Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325 (1999), for a discussion of the
development of the Caroline Doctrine since its inception. Originally, the doctrine applied only to extra-
territorial uses of force. Id. at n.22 and accompanying text. Today, however, it is generally perceived as
applying to any use of force by a state in self-defense. Id. The Encyclopedic Dictionary of International
Law defines the customary right of self-defense as being expressed within the principles of the Caroline
Doctrine. Id.
" Louis Rene Beres, Perspective, After the Gulf War: Israel, Pre-Emption, and Anticipatory Self-
Defense, 13 Hous. J. INT'l L. 259, 263 (1991) (quoting Hugo Grotius).
9 Id. at 263-64 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 11 (1758)).
2' The Caroline Doctrine has been recognized by numerous scholars as encompassing the right of
anticipatory self-defense under customary international law. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International
Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter Framework, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 735, 750 (2002);
Kearley, supra note 17, at 330; Major Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 296 (2000); Rex J. Zedalis, On the
Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms Control Agreements: "Star Wars" and Other
Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 98 (1985).
21 Beres, supra note 18, at 266.
22 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 16, at 480.
23 Id.
24 See Lacey, supra note 20, at 296.
25 Id.
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threatened nation must have exhausted all peaceful means of settlement.27
Although scholars have suggested that a preemptive strike meeting these
three requirements would be justified as a form of anticipatory self-defense
under customary international law,28 any such strike would still need to
comply with the U.N. Charter.29
B. The UN. Charter Generally Prohibits the Use of Force with Limited
Exceptions
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter established the general prohibition on
the threat or use of force in international relations. 30  This standard governs
the use of force under international law with narrow exceptions permitted
under Article 51 and Article 42 of the U.N. Charter. These exceptions allow
the use of force in self-defense3 or upon Security Council authorization.3 2
26 As Secretary of State Webster stated, the state must show that it "did nothing unreasonable or
excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it." Smith, supra note 16, at 481.
27 Id. Secretary of State Webster argued that the British had to show that "admonition or
remonstrance to the persons on board the Caroline was impracticable or would have been unavailing."
Letter from Mr. Webster to a Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857). Also, Samuel von Pufendorf recognized the right to anticipatory self-defense,
"provided there be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, [the aggressor] may put off his
hostile temper." Smith, supra note 16, at 480.
28 See, e.g., Beres, supra note 18, at 262 (suggesting that "pre-emption might be an entirely
permissible option" since the right of anticipatory self-defense has been established under international
law).
29 There is some disagreement whether the "armed attack" requirement under the U.N. Charter has
superseded the broader right represented in the Caroline Doctrine. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of
International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. Ct. L. REV. 113, 120 (1986). Legal scholars have
suggested that the recognition of the inherent right of self-defense under the U.N. Charter incorporates the
Caroline Doctrine's necessity and proportionality requirements, but conditions the right's exercise on an
imminent attack. See Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
Ir:crnaianal Law, 25 HARV. i.L. & Pui3. POL'y 559, 567 (2002); Colonel Guy B. Roberts, The
Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483, 484 (1999); Oscar
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MicH. L. REV. 1620, 1635 (1984). This argument is
particularly significant in the nuclear context because these scholars tend to advocate an adaptation of the
concept of imminent threat to allow anticipatory self-defense based on the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction. See generally Beres, supra note 18; Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Used Armed
Force, supra.
'0 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
31 Id. art. 51 (allowing the use of force in self-defense in response to an "armed attack").
" Id. art. 42 (allowing the use force to restore "international peace and security" upon Security
Council authorization).
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1. Article 2(4): General Prohibition of Force
The U.N. Charter was adopted with the goal of saving "succeeding
generations from the scourge of war" and, to meet that end, it was designed
to "ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods,
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. 3 3  This
principle is protected by Article 2(4)'s general prohibition on the use of
force with limited exceptions for self-defense 34 and collective security upon
authorization of the Security Council.35 Article 2(4) reflects the Charter's
commitment to a system of collective security, 36 rather than unilateral action
on behalf of individual states.
Article 2(4) is the primary provision of the U.N. Charter establishing
the prohibition of the use of force.37 It requires that all members "refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." This
prohibition of both the actual and threatened use of force has been
recognized as binding customary law and is considered jus cogens.38  The
U.N. Charter recognizes two limited exceptions to Article 2(4)'s strictures:
self-defense under Article 5139 and force authorized by the Security Council
in accordance with Article 42.
'3 Id. pmbl.
"4 Id. art. 5 1.
35 Article 39 states that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance" with Articles 41 (measures not involving the use of force) and 42 (after a
determination that peaceful measures have not or will not be adequate, the Security council may authorize
the use of force to "maintain or restore international peace and security"). Id. arts. 39, 41, 42.
36 Id. art. 1, para. I (taking collective measures to prevent and remove threats to the peace,
suppressing acts of aggression, and bringing about pacific settlement of international disputes are listed
amon the "purposes of the United Nations").
Arend, supra note 20, at 737 (referring to the "fundamental presumption" against the use of force
established by Article 2(4)).
3' RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW [THIRD] OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§905 cmt. g (1987). According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a jus cogens rule is a
peremptory norm of international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Convention defines a peremptory norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
ld.
39 Article 51 recognizes the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense. U.N. CHARTER
art. 51.
'0 Article 42 authorizes the Security Council, should peaceful measures be inadequate, to "take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security." Id. art. 42.
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2. Exceptions to the Prohibition of Force
Although the self-defense exception to the general prohibition of force
under international law is explicitly recognized within Article 51, 41 issues
relating to the scope of that right remain unresolved.4 2 According to Article
51, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 43  In
parsing the text of the Charter, three primary questions exist relating to the
permissible exercise of self-defense: (1) what exactly is meant by the
"inherent right" of self-defense; (2) does reference to an "armed attack" limit
the use of force by requiring an act of aggression; 44 and (3) is the use of
force in self-defense permitted only until the Security Council decides to
take action? 45 These questions are debatable and there is no concrete
resolution to these issues. This has resulted in much of the current
controversy over the Bush Administration's preemption doctrine.
There is debate as to whether Article 51 replaces the Caroline
46Doctrine under customary international law. It is generally agreed that the
better interpretation of this provision would preserve, rather than abolish, the
customary right of self-defense-including the right of anticipatory self-
defense.4 7 As a result, states look to both the Caroline Doctrine and Article
51 to gauge whether military action will fall within the self-defense
exception under the U.N. Charter.
41 Id. art 5 1.
42 See RESTATEMENT OF TilE LAW [THIRD] OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 38.
"3 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
44 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 103. "In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is
subject to the state concerned having been the victim of an armed attack." Id. The court recognized that an
armed attack is not limited to action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also
includes more indirect aggression (i.e. "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces" or "substantial involvement therein"). Id. at
103-04. In spite of this recognition that indirect aggression could "rise to the level of an armed attack,"
determining at what point covert actions would justify the use of force in self-defense remains difficult.
See, e.., Arend, supra note 20, at 744-45.
' The phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security" could be read as placing a time limitation on the right of self-defense. See U.N.
CIiARTER art. 5 1.
46 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47 See Smith, supra note 16, at 482 (arguing that the negotiating history and technological
advancement (the Charter is "pre-atomic") support the interpretation that the Charter intended to
incorporate customary law in its entirety, including the right to anticipatory self-defense).
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Article 42 contains another exception to the general prohibition of the
use of force by allowing anticipatory military action after authorization by
the Security Council. This exception has not been as controversial or as
frequently utilized as the self-defense provision, primarily because the
Security Council was essentially immobilized during the Cold War.48 Under
Article 39, the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and recommend
appropriate measures to restore international peace and security. 4 9 By its
terms, the Council must first consider peaceful measures. 50  However, if
those measures are shown to be or are considered inadequate, the Council
"may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 51 Articles 39, 41, and
42 demonstrate the U.N.'s commitment to ensuring that "armed force shall
not be used, save in the common interest,, 52 and that the use of force by an
individual state without Security Council authorization is strictly limited to
the traditional right of self-defense. 53 These limitations on force have been
challenged significantly by the Bush Administration's self-defense doctrine
permitting the use of force in a preemptive strike.
III. BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICY: ZERO TOLERANCE DIPLOMACY AND
THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTIVE STRIKE
Academics and commentators have suggested several potential
methods of addressing the current crisis in North Korea. These include: a
return to the carrot-and-stick approach taken by the Clinton
Administration; 54 imposition of economic sanctions and further isolation; 55
" Id. at 461. This was due, in large part, to the deadlock that resulted from frequent use of the veto
power by the United States and the Soviet Union. Id. Prior to the Gulf War, the Security Council
authorized the use of force only once, during the Korean War. Id.
41 U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (emphasis added).
so Id. art. 41 (listing measures such as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations).
"1 "Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations." Id. art. 42. See also Smith, supra note 16, at 462-63
(discussing the connection between Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter).
52 U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
53 Zedalis, supra note 20, at 121.
54 This approach has generally been favored by China, Russia and South Korea. See, e.g., Charles
Whelan, China, Japan, Russia Uneasy Over U.S. Pressure on North Korea, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Dec. 30,
2002, LEXIS, News File. The Russian Government has discussed a possible "package solution" that would
include "maintaining the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula, strict observance of the NPT, and
fulfillment of Agreed Framework promises; conducting bilateral and multilateral talks with North Korea
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referring North Korea to the U.N. Security Council for the application of
additional economic sanctions;56 or, finally, referral to the U.N. Security
57Council for possible military action as a collective security measure.
Recent U.S. policy pronouncements of the preemption doctrine and the
current military escalation in Iraq suggest, additionally, that force might be
used to eliminate North Korea's nuclear facilities.58
A. The Adoption of the Preemptive Strike Doctrine: Responding to the
Threat Posed By Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism
In September 2002, the Bush Administration released the "U.S.
National Security Strategy," adopting a doctrine allowing preemptive action
to "counter a sufficient threat to our national security., 59 This Strategy was
developed in recognition of the uniquely dangerous and complex threat
60posed to U.S. security by rogue regimes and terrorist organizations.
Considering this threat, the Bush Administration stated that "the United
States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as [it] ha[s] in the
past. 61 Instead, President Bush suggested an adaptation of the concept of
imminent threat to deal with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction by terrorist regimes.62 This new doctrine would permit
preemptive action in self-defense, "even if uncertainty remains as to the time
and place of the enemy's attack.,
63
that would produce security guarantees, and resuming humanitarian and economic aid programs in North
Korea." Cristina Chuen, Russian Responses to the North Korean Crisis, at
http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/rusdprk.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2003).
55 See James Dao, Nuclear Standoff" Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea,
N.Y. TIMFs, Feb. 6, 2003, at A13, LEXIS, News File (stating that "no option" has been taken off the table,
including sanctions or military options).
56 Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean Peninsula. Hearing Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 108th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2003) (statement of Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Sec'y of
State), available at http://www.state.gov/s/drm/17170.htm (suggesting that, unless North Korea takes
immediate action to comply with its treaty obligations, the IAEA Board of Directors will likely report
North Korea's continuing noncompliance to the Security Council).
57 id.
'8 The United States, although affirming its belief that the situation can be resolved diplomatically,
has consistently stated that all options must remain on the table. See Dao, supra note 55.
59 National Security Strategy, supra note 9, at 15.
60 Id. sec. V.
" Id. at 15.
62 Id.
63 id.
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B. The Potential for U.S. Preemptive Action Against North Korea
The Bush Administration has taken a proactive approach in using the
preemption doctrine to justify the use of force in response to the attempted
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.64 The United States
worked with the Security Council for authorization of "serious
consequences" should Saddam Hussein be found guilty of a "material
breach" under the U.N. Resolution requiring full compliance with weapons
65inspections. When failure of passing a second resolution appeared
imminent, the Bush Administration chose to invade Iraq without prior
Security Council authorization.66
Although the Bush Administration has suggested that a different
strategy will be employed with North Korea, and has repeatedly expressed
its desire for a diplomatic and peaceful solution,67 it is possible that these
statements are more representative of a desire to avoid a "two-front" conflict
68than an actual policy toward North Korea. Moreover, the Administration
has stated that it will keep all options open, including military action.69 The
possibility remains that the United States will silence North Korea's nuclear
brinkmanship with a preemptive military strike.70
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
In the parts that follow, this Comment outlines North Korea's treaty
71 72obligations under the NPT 1 and the Joint Declaration, the crisis of 1993,
and the remarkably similar nuclear brinkmanship North Korea is engaging in
today. Next, the doctrine of preemptive strike is applied to the current crisis,
leading to the conclusion that a preemptive military response against North
Korea would lack legal support under both customary international law and
the U.N. Charter.
6' See David Von Drehle, Bush Walks a Thin Tightrope of Expansive Goals, WASIL POST, Mar. 21,
2003, LEXIS, News File.
65 David Sanger, The World: Over There; A New Front Opens but It's Still One War, N.Y. TIMES,
October 20, 2002, LEXIS, News File.
66 Drehle, supra note 64.
67 Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Dept. of State, North Korean Nuclear Program
(Oct. 16, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14432.htm (last visited May 4, 2003).
68 Sanger, supra note 65.
69 Dao, supra note 55.
70 See id.
71 NPT, supra note 6.
'2 Joint Declaration, supra note 4.
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A. North Korea's Pre-1993 Obligations Under the International Non-
Proliferation Regime
North Korea's treaty obligations prior to the 1993 crisis were
contained within the NPT73 and a Joint Declaration,74 relating to the de-
nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. These obligations were designed to
prevent a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, particularly between North
and South Korea. The United States, due to its security commitments in
South Korea and Japan, had a significant interest in maintaining a nuclear-
free North Korea prior to the 1993 crisis and still does today.75
1. The NPT Established North Korea's Non-Proliferation Obligations
The international community has long recognized the potential
dangers of proliferation and the massive destructive power of nuclear
weapons. In response to an increasing number of nuclear states, 77 the
United States began to work urgently towards developing an international
nonproliferation treaty during the 1950s.78 On August 17, 1965 the United
States submitted a draft nonproliferation treaty to the U.N. General
Assembly that was considered along with a Soviet version.79 The combined
and revised draft of the NPT was opened for signature on June 12, 1968, and
entered into force on March 5, 1970.80 It has since been joined by 187
countries and is the most widely ratified arms limitation and disarmament
agreement in history.81
The primary goals of the NPT are to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons, promote cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and
73 NPT, supra note 5.
14 Joint Declaration, supra note 4.
75 Id.
76 U.S. State Dept., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at
http://www.state.gov/global/arms/treaties/nptl .html (last visited Dec. 14, 2002).
77 In addition to the United States, the Soviet Union in 1949, Great Britain in 1952, France in 1960
and China in 1964 became nuclear weapon states. id.
78 id.
79 d.
go Id.
81 United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Brief Background, at
http://www.un.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons: Brief Background]. The United States ratified the NPT in 1969 while North Korea did not
accede to the treaty until 1985. Id. See also Shariff Shuja, Looking Forward by Looking Back, a
Pragmatic Look at Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control, NATIONAL OBSERVER-
AUSTRALIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS, Spring 2002, at 59 (recognizing the NPT as the "centerpiece" of the
International Non-Proliferation Regime).
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work towards eventual nuclear disarmament.8 2  In order to achieve these
goals, the treaty contains four primary provisions. Article I prevents the
transfer of nuclear weapons or explosives to any non-nuclear state83 while
Article II forbids the receipt of these materials from nuclear states.84 Article
III requires that non-nuclear states accept safeguards to verify
nonproliferation compliance 85 that are implemented by the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").86 Article VI is designed to achieve the
eventual goal of complete nuclear disarmament, calling for the good faith
pursuit of negotiations "relating to [the] cessation of the nuclear arms
race."
87
2. The Joint Declaration Established Regional Standards Prohibiting
Nuclear Proliferation on the Korean Peninsula
With the NPT already in place, North Korea and South Korea began
developing methods of ensuring regional security. On January 20, 1992,
North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration "[w]ith a view to
:2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Brief Background, supra note 81.
' "Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly or indirectly..." NPT, supra note 5, art. I.84 "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly..
NPT, supra note 5, art. II.
"s Under Article III, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty is required to accept
safeguards negotiated between itself and the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). NPT, supra
note 6, art. III, para. 1. The purpose of these safeguards is to verify that nuclear energy is being used for
peaceful purposes and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Id. North Korea
concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that went into force on April 10, 1992, DPRK-IAEA:
Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Jan. 30, 1992, DPRK-IAEA, 33 I.L.M. 315 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
However, in a 2002 report on DPRK safeguards, the IAEA stated that, due to North Korea's non-
compliance, it has "never had the complete picture regarding DPRK nuclear activities and has never been
able to provide assurances regarding the peaceful character of the DPRK nuclear programme." IAEA, Fact
Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, (Dec. 16, 2002), at
www.iaea.org/worldatomi/PressPrelease/2002/med-advise_052.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).
86 On December 8, 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed to the U.N. General
Assembly the creation of an organization to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy while preventing its
use for military purposes. DAVID FISCHER, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:
TirE FIRST FORTY YEARS 9 (1997). This proposal then led to the creation of the IAEA with its statute
coming into force July 29, 1957. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature
Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
www.iaea.or.at/worldatonVDocuments/statute.htnil (last visited Mar. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Statute of the
IAEA].
7 "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on
a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." NPT,
supra note 5, art. VI.
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denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and thus removing the danger of
nuclear war, creating conditions and [an] environment favorable for peace
and peaceful reunification of [their] country and contributing to peace and
security in Asia and the rest of the world."88 Under the Joint Declaration,
both states agreed that:
(1) The North and South shall refrain from testing,
manufacture, production, acceptance, possession,
stockpiling, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons;
(2) The North and South shall use nuclear energy only for
peaceful purposes;
(3) The North and South shall not possess nuclear
reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities; and
(4) The North and South shall make an inspection of objects
chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the
sides through procedures and methods defined by the
North-South Joint Committee of Nuclear Control in order
to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
8 9
In spite of North Korea's non-proliferation commitments, its refusal to allow
complete inspections of alleged nuclear facilities led to the crisis of 1993.
B. The 1993 Crisis Led to the Clinton Administration's Bargaining for
North Korean Compliance with the NPT
Concerns over North Korea's attempted withdrawal from the NPT in
1993 led to the creation of a landmark agreement, providing economic
incentives for North Korea's compliance with its obligations under the
NPT.90  Before this compromise was achieved, however, there were
concerns that the escalation of military tensions would result in the use of
force on the Korean peninsula. 91 This situation is remarkably similar to the
current crisis. The primary difference between the two lies in the Bush
s8 Joint Declaration, supra note 4.
89 Id.
90 See Agreed Framework, supra note 3.
91 OBERDORFER, supra note 1, at 311-16 (discussing the military buildup in response to escalating
tension between the United States and North Korea).
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Administration's hard-line response to North Korea's nuclear
brinkmanship.92
1. Events Leading to the Crisis: North Korea 's Attempted Withdrawal
from the NPT
Although North Korea signed the NPT in 1985; 93 as of 1992, it had
yet to fully comply with its obligation to allow full inspections of its nuclear
facilities.94 North Korea finally concluded a "safeguards agreement ' 95 with
96the IAEA on January 30, 1992. Under this agreement, North Korea was
"obligated to accept safeguards on all fissionable materials, provide a
preliminary accounting of materials and facilities, maintain a system for
accounting and control of fissionable materials, and provide annual reports
",97of safeguarded materials inventory. Even after the safeguards agreement
was in place, North Korea refused to allow inspections of all military sites.98
This refusal set off a chain of events that led to North Korea's eventual
attempted withdrawal from the NPT. 99
By a letter addressed to the President of the U.N. Security Council on
March 12, 1993,00 the government of North Korea became the first and only
country to attempt withdrawal from the NPT in accordance with Article X,
paragraph I of the Treaty.10' The letter stated that the behavior of South
92 See generally Laney & Shaplan, supra note 7, discussion of the Bush Administration's "hard-line"
response to North Korea's alleged admission of having a secret nuclear program and a comparison of that
response to the more diplomatic approach of the Clinton Administration.
Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, supra note 86.
Helen M. Cousineau, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Global Non-Proliferation
Regime: A U.S. Policy Agenda, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 407, 426 (1994).15 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the NPT's requirement that a safeguards
agreement be completed between non-nuclear-weapons states parties to the treaty. NPT, supra note 5, art.
III).
9 Mark E. Newcomb, Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense and the Korean Crisis, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNA'L L. 603, 610 (1994).
97 Id.
"s See id. at 611-12.
99 Id. at 610-13. See also Jeong Pires, North Korean Time Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse It? A
Review ofInternational Economic Sanctions as an Option, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307, 320-23 (1994)
(discussing events leading to North Korea's attempted withdrawal from the NPT in 1993).105 Democratic People's Republic of Korea Withdraws from Non-Proliferation Treaty, 32 I.L.M. 602
(1993).101 Article X, paragraph I of the NPT states that:
Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty,
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council
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Korea and the United States jeopardized the "supreme interests" of North
Korea. 2 In particular, North Korea cited the resumption of Team Spirit
10 3
joint military exercises and accused the United States of influencing the
IAEA to adopt a resolution demanding that North Korea open particular
military sites for inspection as evidence of "strong-arm" behavior. North
Korea proffered that this behavior necessitated its withdrawal from the
NPT.1
0 4
Because three months advance notice is required for withdrawal under
Article X of the NPT, North Korea's withdrawal was not scheduled to
become effective until June 12, 1993.105 During this interval, the
international community used diplomatic pressure to encourage North Korea
to reconsider its actions. On May 11, 1993, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 825, calling for North Korea's submission to inspections
and reconsideration of its withdrawal from the NPT. 106 After Resolution 825
was essentially ignored by North Korea,' °7 the Clinton Administration
stepped in to apply additional pressure.'
8
2. The Clinton Administration's Approach: Diplomacy and Bartering
for Non-Proliferation Compliance
The Clinton Administration displayed its commitment to the NPT and
nonproliferation in 1993 by attempting to use diplomatic and economic
pressure to prevent North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty. 0 9 During
that time of crisis, the Clinton Administration also moved additional troops
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
NPT, supra note 5, art. X, para. 1.
102 Democratic People's Republic of Korea Withdraws from NPT, supra note 100.
103 Team Spirit is the name for a long-running series of joint military maneuvers involving U.S. and
South Korean troops east of Seoul. ORERDORFPR, supra note 1, at 76. The North Korean government has
viewed Team Spirit exercises as hostile acts-as "dress rehearsals for an invasion from the South." Id. at
77.
104 Democratic People's Republic of Korea Withdraws from NPT, supra note 100.
105 Id.
106 U.N. Security Council Res. 825, U.N. SCOR, 3212th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (1993)
[hereinafter Res. 8251.
107 See Ryan Barilleaux & Andrew llsu Kim, Clinton, Korea, and Presidential Diplomacy, 162
WORLD AFF. 29 (1999).
log Id.
'o' See id. for a more complete discussion of the Clinton Administration's response to the potential
Korean nuclear crisis in 1993.
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into the region, setting the stage for possible military action."1° Eventually, a
compromise was reached through negotiation of the Agreed Framework."'
The Agreed Framework's primary purpose was to establish a nuclear-
free Korean peninsula. 12  To accomplish this, the Clinton Administration
offered North Korea economic incentives, including two light-water reactors
with a target date of 2003 for completion and free oil shipments until the
reactors' completion, 113 in exchange for continued compliance with the NPT
and its safeguards." 4 In addition to direct aid, the United States pledged to
move towards full normalization of political and economic relations,' 15 an
important step for the historically isolated North Korea towards joining the
international community.
The Agreed Framework was greeted with a rather lukewarm
reception.' 6 North Korea's recent admission to having a program that
produces enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, however, suggests that
skepticism was reasonable. First, it was not effective in completely
preventing proliferation in North Korea. 1 7  Moreover, one scholar has
argued that the Agreed Framework established a dangerous precedent as a
"multi-billion dollar 'sale' of North Korean compliance with the NPT. '" 8
The Bush Administration has relinquished the more lenient negotiation
strategy of the Clinton Administration for a policy of zero tolerance
diplomacy1 9 and the doctrine of preemptive strike.' 20
1' See OBERDORFER, supra note I, at 324-26 (discussing three options for the buildup of U.S. troops
within the region).
. See Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, History of the
Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001), Section 4, Arms Control, at
www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059.htm; Barilleaux & Kim, supra note 107 (discussing tension and
negotiations eventually leading to the conclusion of the Framework Agreement); Democratic People's
Republic of Korea Withdrawalfrom Non-Proliferation Treaty, supro note 100.
12 Agreed Framework, supra note 3.
113 Id.
114 id.
115 Id.
116 Congress reacted strongly to the Agreed Framework, proposing several amendments that would
have prevented the United States from providing funds to the light-water reactor project and calling for
stricter terms for the deal with North Korea. See Barilleaux & Kim, supra note 107. In spite of this
dissatisfaction, most legislators were unable to propose an alternative and eventually grudgingly supported
the Framework Agreement. ld The American public was also not prepared for such a broad agreement
with a 'Pariah" nation. OBERDORFER, supra note 1, at 358.
'.North Korean Nuclear Program, supra note 67. It is important to note that, although officials in
the North Korean government initially admitted to having a nuclear program, they later stated that their
policy was to neither confirm nor deny its existence. See Don Kirk, Threats and Responses: The Asian
Front; North Korea Softens its Tone on Nuclear Arms Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A22.
s See Shuja, supra note 81.
iS See, e.g., Laney & Shaplen, supra note 7 (noting the Bush Administration's "hard-line" response
to North Korea's nuclear admission); Strategy, supra note 9, at 15 (outlining the Bush Administration's
doctrine of preemptive strike in response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).
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C. The Current Crisis on the Korean Peninsula
On October 4, 2002, Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly and a
delegation of senior U.S. officials traveled to North Korea in order to begin
talks on several issues, including North Korea's nuclear program.1 21  At
these talks, Assistant Secretary Kelly informed North Korean officials that
the United States had information indicating that North Korea had a program
to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, a serious violation of the Agreed
Framework and the NPT. 12 2  According to Secretary Kelly, North Korea
initially acknowledged that it did have such a program. 123  North Korean
officials then blamed the United States for its breach-stating that the
Agreed Framework had been nullified due to a series of U.S. actions,
particularly the failure to deliver two civilian nuclear power plants that were
promised under the agreement. 124 In October 2002, North Korea backed off
from its contention that the Agreed Framework was null and void,
suggesting instead that it was "hanging by a thread."1
25
Although North Korea has attempted to characterize the current crisis
as a bilateral issue between itself and the United States, the international
community has also been involved in the attempt to regain North Korean
compliance with its treaty obligations. 26 A resolution passed by the IAEA
Board of Governors 27 on November 29, 2002 expressed concern over
reports of North Korea's un-safeguarded128 uranium enrichment program
120 See David Sanger, Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking Foes First, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at
Al (contrasting the Bush Administration's preemption doctrine with the Clinton Administration's policy
emphasizing international cooperation and non-proliferation treaties to combat the development of weapons
of mass destruction).
121 See Sanger, supra note 3; North Korean Nuclear Program, supra note 67.
2,2 North Korean Nuclear Program, supra note 67.
123 id.
i24 See id.; Shenon, supra note 11. North Korea alleged that the United States has not observed any
of the four articles contained within the Framework Agreement and has made threatening statements
toward North Korea, including it in an "Axis of Evil" and labeling the North as a target for preemptive
nuclear strikes. DPRK Press Conference, supra note 2.
125 Kirk, supra note 117.
121 See James Brooke, Japan Hopes to Use Aid to Press North Korea to End A-Bomb Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A6; James Dao, U.S. Seeks Support to Press North Korea: China is Urged to Try
to Halt Pyongyang's Nuclear Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at A6; Press Statement, Philip T.
Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dept. of State, International Atomic Energy Agency Adopts Resolution
on North Korea (Nov. 29, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/15582.htm (last visited May 4,
2003).
'27 The Board of Governors is a thirty-five member board responsible for overseeing and undertaking
the responsibilities of the IAEA. See Statute of the IAEA, supra note 86, art. VI.
Article 3, paragraph I obligates non-nuclear weapons states to accept the safeguards of the IAEA
"with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices." NPT, supra note 5. North Korea completed a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA, which went into force in 1992. See Safeguards Agreement, supra note 85. North Korea's expulsion
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and the repeated statements by North Korea's government that it is entitled
to possess nuclear weapons, contrary to its obligations under the Agreed
Framework and the NPT. 129 This resolution also called on North Korea to
cooperate with the IAEA to meet the inspection requirements contained
within the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement and for North Korea to
"give up any nuclear weapons programme, expeditiously and in a verifiable
manner.' 130 In response, North Korea's Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun
stated that North Korea could not accept the resolution, stating the IAEA
was employing a "unilateral and unfair approach." 
31
Pressure by the United States and the IAEA has not eliminated the
nuclear threat posed by North Korea's weapons program. Tensions within
the region have escalated in response to North Korea's nuclear
brinkmanship.' 32  North Korea has removed its nuclear program from the
watchful eyes of the IAEA; 133 it has expelled IAEA Inspectors from the
country, disabled cameras within Yongbyon (a fuel reprocessing plant), and
started reopening Yongbyon and a small nuclear reactor that had been closed
since 1994.134 Furthermore, conventional military concerns have escalated
due to two recent events: the interception of an unarmed American spy
plane in international airspace by a North Korean fighter jet 35 and the test of
an anti-ship missile on February 25, 2003.136
of inspectors and removal of cameras at Yongbyon was a violation of the Safeguards Agreement, leaving
the IAEA without any ability to ensure North Korea's nuclear technology is being used only for peaceful
purposes. See id. art. 9.
129 Press Release, IAEA Press Centre, IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in
the DPRK (Nov. 29, 2002), at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/med-advise033.shtml
(last visited May 4, 2003) [hereinafter IAEA Board Resolution). The resolution represents a non-binding
statement of concern that was transmitted to North Korea. Interestingly, this resolution both refers to and
echoes Res. 825, issued by the Security Council during the 1993 Crisis, which was essentially ignored by
the North Korean Government during that previous crisis. Res. 825, supra note 106.
"0 IAEA Board Resolution, supra note 129, at (h)8, #9.
13' Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, supra note 85. This statement echoes the accusations
levied at the IAEA in North Korea's statement of withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, accusing the IAEA of
succumbing to pressure from a heavy-handed United States in ordering inspections of two nuclear facilities.
See Democratic People's Republic of Korea Withdraws from Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 100.
132 Barbara Demick, The World: North Korea's Bellicose Rhetoric Against U.S. is Seen as Mostly
Brinkmanship, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2002, at A4, LEXIS, News File; Sanger, supra note 3.
133 See James Brooke, Japan Fears North Korea: US. Promises Defense Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2002, at A7.
134 id.
135 Four North Korean MIGs intercepted the American spy plane and, according to reports, made
universally recognized hand signals for the crew of the American plane to follow them. Eric Schmitt,
North Korean Fliers Said to Have Sought Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2003, at Al. This led U.S.
officials to conclude that the North Korean pilots were attempting to force the aircraft to land in order to
take the crew hostage. Id. However, there was no direct radio communication, so there is no way to
confirm this hypothesis. Id.
136 Id.
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On January 10, 2003, North Korea issued a statement announcing its
"automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT."'1 7
In its statement, North Korea revoked its suspension of withdrawal from the
NPT issued during the 1993 crisis, therefore bypassing the three-month time
period required under the NPT for effective withdrawal. 138  Along with its
withdrawal, North Korea announced that it was "totally free from the
binding force of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA."'' 39 According to
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") estimates, with these nuclear facilities
reopened, North Korea could potentially produce five or six nuclear
weapons within six months. 1
40
V. PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE TO THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
Since there is currently no Security Council Resolution authorizing
the use of force in response to the nuclear standoff on the Korean
Peninsula,'14 any military action taken by the United States would have to be
justified as an act of self-defense under customary international law or the
U.N. Charter. 42  There are three rationales upon which the United States
could use the principle of self-defense to justify the use of preemptive force
'13 North Korea: Statement on Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A7, LEXIS, News File.
13s See id. See also NPT, supra note 5, art. X, para. I (recognizing states parties' right to withdraw
from the Treaty upon a decision that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized the "supreme interests of its
country" while requiring three months advance notice for such withdrawal to be effective).
139 North Korea: Statement on Pullout, supra note 137.
"o The CIA estimates that North Korea already has one or two nuclear weapons. Although this alone
is troubling, the potential threat posed by North Korea would significantly increase if it were to acquire
several more nuclear weapons; with only one or two nuclear weapons, a State is less likely to use or sell
them to other countries or terrorist groups. See, e.g., David Sanger, President Makes Case That North
Korea is No Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 2003, LEXIS, News File. The two weapons North Korea is believed
to already possess were made prior to the 1994 Framework Agreement. See David Sanger, Bush Plays
Down Rift With Allies Over U.S. Stance on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, LEXIS, News File.
Therefore, North Korea has actually been an undeclared nuclear power for years. Id. In spite of these
concerns, North Korea's Ambassador, Pak Gil Yon, has stated that, although Pyongyang was withdrawing
from the Treaty, it "had no intention of producing nuclear weapons or using its nuclear technology for
anything other than peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity. Security Council Notified ofDPRK's
Withdrawal from Nuclear Arms Accord (Jan. 13, 2003), at
http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatomi/Press/Focus/laeaDprk/archive/SCNotified of DPRKwithdrawalI0Jan
.pdf (last visited May 4, 2003).
4 ' Nor is it likely that the Council will authorize the use of force in the future, considering their
China and Russia's veto capabilities and their opposition to pressuring North Korea. See Phillip Saunders
& Jing-dong Yuan, Korea Crisis Will Test Chinese Diplomacy, ASIAN TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/chidiplo.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); Whelan, supra note 54.
"42 Since it is debatable to what extent the U.N. Charter has revised or replaced customary
international law with respect to the use of force in self-defense, supra note 29, this Comment will analyze
the doctrine of preemptive strike with respect to both custom and the principles embodied in Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.
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against North Korea. First, the attempt to develop or acquire additional
weapons of mass destruction might upset the nuclear balance in Northeast
Asia, thereby constituting an "imminent threat" to international security.
143
Second, North Korea's actions might present an imminent threat because
North Korea could sell weapons to terrorist organizations. 14 4 Finally, threat
or use of force might be necessary to enforce North Korean compliance with
its treaty obligations.
45
These justifications for preemptive action do not meet any
internationally acceptable rationale for self-defense. First, they do not meet
the standards of necessity and proportionality established under the Caroline
Doctrine and customary international law. Second, it would be
inappropriate to even consider military action in the North Korea situation,
given the requirement that states exhaust all peaceful remedies before
resorting to the use of force, 14 6 a principle that has been affirmed by the
collective security structure established within the U.N. Charter. Third, the
use of force in self-defense has been limited under Article 51 to being in
response to an "armed attack"'' 47 which, by definition, would not allow
preemptive action against North Korea or its alleged nuclear facilities.
14' The United States has not endorsed this argument, probably because of its own vast nuclear
arsenal; a number of non-nuclear states, however, have argued in favor of the illegality of nuclear weapons.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") addressed this debate in a recent advisory opinion. See I.C.J.,
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.M. 809, para. 48 (1996)
(acknowledging that possession of nuclear weapons may indeed justify an inference of preparedness to use
them, while also recognizing the principle of deterrence relying on a credible threat).
'" See 2002 State of the Union, supra note 8, for statements by the Bush Administration linking
North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an Axis of Evil and connecting their development of weapons of mass
destruction with the activities of terrorist organizations.
115 See generally Smith, supra note 16 (discussing coercive arms control as an attack on state
sovereignty and suggesting that the Security Council's decision not to denounce a U.S. strike on an Iraqi
nuclear complex is evidence of an emerging norm allowing the use of military force to control the
production or use of particular weapons); Zedalis, supra note 20 (noting that Soviet and American efforts to
destroy missile defense systems violating the ABM treaty would likely be unable to satisfy the strict
standard of "imminent threat" required under customary international law).
146 The requirement that states exhaust peaceful measures before resorting to force was established
customary international law. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. This principle has also been
reaffirmed within the U.N. Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. I (requiring that parties to any dispute
"first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice").
I" U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. Although some have argued that a broader right to use force is
necessary to deal with the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons, the text of Article 51 explicitly
limits self-defense to being in response to an "armed attack." Id. art. 51. Furthermore, U.N. members
generally favor this more restrictive interpretation. See Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the
Use of Force, supra note 29, at 133.
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A. The Caroline Doctrine: Necessity and Proportionality of Preemptive
Military Action on the Korean Peninsula
Under customary international law, any preemptive strike by the
United States against North Korea's alleged nuclear facilities would have to
meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality established in the
Caroline Doctrine. A preemptive strike would not be justified based solely
on North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons or its violation of arms
control agreements due to a lack of necessity.
1. Necessity and the Doctrine of Preemptive Strike: The Difficulty of
Proving Imminence in the Face of an Uncertain Threat
One of the primary difficulties in applying the doctrine of preemptive
strike in the Korean Peninsula lies in meeting the requirement that North
Korea's actions constitute an imminent threat to U.S. security. As
established in the Caroline Doctrine,' 48 the necessity of self-defense must be
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation."' 149  This concept is often expressed today in terms of
"imminence."' 50 Although the attempt to acquire and possess nuclear
weapons is troubling, especially considering their devastating character, the
International Court of Justice ("ICY) has recognized that these activities are
not per se illegal.' 5' In making its decision, the ICJ emphasized the tension
between an emerging custom-prohibiting the manufacture, possession, and
use of nuclear weapons and represented by current non-proliferation treaties
on the one hand-and the continuing practice of nuclear deterrence on the
other. 5 2  This distinction between law and practice makes it extremely
See discussion infra Part III.A.
; Lacey, supra note 20, at 296.
15o See, e.g., Strategy, supra note 9, at !5 (stating that, for centuries, international law had recognized
that nations need not wait to be attacked before they defend against an "imminent danger").
151 See ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note
143, para. 105(2). The Court found that neither customary nor international law comprehensively or
universally prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Id. para. 105(2)B. It also found, however, that
the use of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 (general prohibition of the use of
force) and Article 51 (self-defense) of the U.N. Charter is unlawful. Id. para. 105(2)C. Furthermore, the
threat or use of nuclear weapons should also comply with the international law of war, humanitarian
principles and relevant treaty obligations. Id. But see id. para. 62 (recognizing that Treaties, such as the
NPT, could be "seen as foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use of [nuclear] weapons").152 Id. para. 65-6.
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difficult to argue that the attempt to develop, acquire, or possess nuclear
weapons justifies a preemptive strike under customary international law. 153
The Bush Administration's attempt to justify the use of force against
states based on their alleged attempts to acquire nuclear weapons is
especially troubling because it creates a double standard. The United States,
Great Britain, China, Russia, and France maintain nuclear arsenals, 54 and
have been accused of violating arms control agreements 55-similar actions
to those currently being taken by North Korea. Labeling North Korea's
nuclear program as an "imminent threat" would further aggravate claims that
the United States engages in nuclear hypocrisy. 56  Moreover, the "mere
possession of weapons [does] not constitute an imminent threat of their
use."
157
The sale of nuclear weapons to terrorists is an admittedly troubling
possibility, particularly in the wake of September 11, 2001. In spite of these
reasonable concerns, mere speculation that North Korea might provide
weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations does not justify the
use of force under international law. 58  Currently, there has been no
connection established between North Korea and A] Qaeda, or any other
terrorist organization. 5 9  Furthermore, the CIA estimates that North Korea
has only one or two nuclear weapons, 160 making it highly unlikely they
153 This is a particularly difficult argument to make because the United States is one of five nuclear
states recognized under the NPT. See HARALAMBOS ATHANASAOPULOS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (2000). France, China, Germany and Russia are the other four nuclear powers-
states that the U.S. does not view as a threat and also, for the most part, are currently considered U.S. allies.
Id. It is interesting to note that the nuclear states also tend to be considered the Great Powers
internationally. See Gavin McCormack, North Korea in the Vice, 18 NEW LEFT REV. 5, 2002. As a result,
it is rational to conclude that a state would desire nuclear weapons for reasons other than aggression, i.e.,
prestige or as a deterrent against aggression. Id. This double standard has resulted in criticism of U.S.
nuclear policy as hypocritical. Id.
154 McCormack, supra note 153.
155 Id.
156 See id. (discussing U.S. nuclear hypocrisy).
157 Arend, supra note 20, at 750.
158 Although the Bush Administration has attempted to use the link between Iraq and Al Qaeda to
bolster the U.S. argument for the use of force to disarm Saddam Hussein, this attempt has been viewed with
some skepticism. This perception is evident in France and Germany's opposition to military action against
Iraq without U.N. authorization. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11,
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 905, 920-21 (2002) (suggesting that an expansive view ofjus ad bellum, such as that
expressed in President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech and the Administration's assertion of the right of
anticipatory self-defense, is "not infinitely elastic"); Fareed Zakaria, The Arrogant Empire, NEWSWEEK
Mar. 24, 2003, at 18.
'59 Although the Bush Administration has attempted to "equate weapons of mass destruction with
support for terrorism," the intemational community has not been very receptive to this idea. See generally
Zakaria, supra note 158 (noting international opposition to the war in Iraq).
160 See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 140 (suggesting the different approach taken by the Bush
Administration toward North Korea, as opposed to Iraq, is due to "the North's existing nuclear capability
and its ability to wreak enormous damage on Seoul with its conventional weapons").
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would deplete their entire stock by selling to terrorists.' 6' Even if North
Korea were to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal, this would not
necessarily mean that it would sell additional weapons to terrorists. 62 There
are important distinctions between the possession, sale, and use of nuclear
weapons in terms of their potential threat.' 63  The speculative and indirect
fear that North Korea may sell nuclear weapons to terrorists does not
constitute an imminent threat justifying the use of force in self-defense.
Furthermore, the use of preemptive force in North Korea in response
to violations of arms control agreements also fails to meet the Caroline
standard due to a lack of necessity. Violations of arms control agreements
are of significant international concern; however, this behavior is actually
fairly common among states. 164  In fact, North Korea has consistently
accused the United States of violating its commitments under the Agreed
Framework.
65
The support of the United States for the Agreed Framework has been
inconsistent, particularly under the current Bush Administration. 166 As the
target date for delivery of two light-water reactors approached, North
Korean leaders became increasingly doubtful that they would actually be
built.167 Furthermore, the Agreed Framework called for the United States to
161 Logically, it would not make sense for North Korea to deplete its entire stockpile, particularly
because its nuclear arsenal may be able to deter preemptive action by the United States--even in the face of
current military tensions and escalation. See id.
.62 If North Korea did sell a nuclear weapon to Al Qaeda, or a similar terrorist organization, this
would undoubtedly change the analysis and it would be difficult to argue that the use of force would not be
justified self-defense. See Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of
Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 151, 180 (noting
that international legal scholars and state practice support the view that state support of terrorist bombings
qualify as an armed attack justifying the use of force under the U.N. Charter). Although mere possession
does not link weapons of mass destruction to terrorism, the sale of nuclear weapons to a terrorist
organization with the knowledge that they will most likely be used against another state would qualify as an
armed attack. See also Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 103, para. 195 (stating that an armed
attack includes "not only acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also
assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support"). It is difficult,
however, to speculate that such a sale will occur in the absence of evidence or ability.
163 See Arend, supra note 20, at 750 (noting that the "mere possession of weapons would not
constitute an imminent threat of their use").
14 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, speaking in front of the U.N. Disarmament Board, called for
the preservation and consolidation of existing multi-lateral norms through "adherence to treaties and
fulfillment of treaty obligations." See Secretary-General Warns of "Disturbing" Erosion in International
Norms on Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Remarks to Disarmament Board (Feb. 6, 2003), UN Doc.
SG/SM/8598 DC/2853. In doing so, he noted that North Korea and Iraq are "only the tip of the iceberg"
contributing to the gradual erosion of international norms on weapons of mass destruction. Id.
165 See Demick, supra note 132; DPRK Press Conference, supra note 2; Shenon, supra note 11.
66 Laney & Shaplen, supra note 7, at 21 (noting that "Bush's support of the 1994 Agreed Framework
was lukewarm at best" and that his Administration viewed it as a form of blackmail).
167 Toby Dalton, U.S. Policy on North Korea: The View from Seoul (Mar. 25, 2002), at
www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p=8&PublicationID=939; Demick, supra note
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work towards normalization of diplomatic and economic ties with North
Korea.168  Economically destitute and isolated, North Korea desperately
needs normalization,169 but the United States has been reluctant to instigate
change due to its distrust of Kim Jong I1 and his reclusive regime. 170  North
Korea has cited the failure to deliver light-water reactors by the target date
and to normalize relations as breaches of the Agreed Framework by the
United States, 171 an example of the finger pointing that can occur in
connection with violations of arms control agreements.
Although there has been some support for the concept of coercive
arms control, 72 this has been done through Security Council Resolutions. 73
Unilateral action without Council authorization has been condemned as a
"clear violation of the United Nations and the norms of international
conduct."' 174  Considering the wide-ranging violations of arms treaties, it
would be difficult to distinguish which acts constitute a threat and which do
not. This suggests the need for debate and multilateral action through the
auspices of the Security Council. 175
132. Reactor construction delays have resulted in the date for completion being pushed back from 2003 to
2008.
168 Agreed Framework, supra note 3, at II.
169 Kim Jong I1 has pursued normalization of economic and political relations with the United States
and a peace settlement formally ending the Korean War without success since signing the Framework
Agreement in 1994. Normalization would potentially unlock economic aid from not only the United States,
but also from Japan, Western Europe and the World Bank. See Selig S. Harrison, Time to Leave Korea,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, LEXIS, News File.
170 See Demick, supra note 132 (according to Rhee Bong Jo, an assistant South Korean Minister who
visited Pyongyang in October, 2002, "North Korea wants very badly to establish relations with the U.S....
Their admission was for the sake of negotiation. This was brinkmanship").
"7' See, DPRK Press Conference, supra note 2.
172 Smith supra note 16, at 507 (suggesting that, although the U.N. Charter mentions neither
anticipatory self-defense nor coercive arms control, both have been endorsed by the Security Council, as
evidenced by the Security Council's endorsement of U.S. strikes against Iraqi reactors in 1991).173 Id.
I74 ld. at 455.
75 The United States has also been accused numerous times of violating treaty agreements, including
the Agreed Framework. DPRK Press Conference, supra note 2; See also McCormack, supra note 153
(discussing nuclear hypocrisy, particularly the United States' refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and the placement of nuclear weapons in South Korea up until 1991). Furthermore, the entire
doctrine of preemptive strike appears to violate U.S. security assurances in connection to the NPT. See
U.S. Presidential Declaration Delivered to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on
November 17, 1978, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, Sales No. E.
95.1.17, at 20-21 (1995), which states:
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon State
Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or any comparable
internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in
the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by
such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in
carrying out or sustaining the attack.
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2. Difficulties in Gauging the Proportionality of the Use of Force in a
Preemptive Strike
Another dilemma that arises in using force before an overt aggressive
act has occurred is the difficulty in evaluating the proportionality of a
particular response. In 1993, it was estimated that there would be as many
as one million casualties, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, if full-
scale war resumed on the Peninsula.176 Moreover, out-of-pocket costs to the
United States would exceed an estimated US$100 billion and the destruction
of property and interruption of business activity would cost more than US$1
trillion. 177 Military action today would likely produce similar casualties to
those estimates that led the United States to balk at the use of force during
the crisis in 1994.178 It is difficult to speculate on the appropriateness of
potential action-particularly in light of the uncertain nature of the threat to
U.S. security.
179
3. The Bush Administration Has Not Exhausted Peaceful Remedies in
Dealing With the North Korean Nuclear Crisis
Although not cited as often as other aspects of the Caroline Doctrine,
the exhaustion of peaceful remedies is an important principle of customary
international law that has been reinforced by the U.N. Charter.'8" This
principle reiterates the idea that force should not be used except in cases of
absolute necessity. 8' The importance of utilizing diplomacy and negotiation
is evident when one compares the 1993 crisis with the current crisis in North
176 OBERDORFER, supra note 1, at 324.
177 Id.
17s McCormack, supra note 153.
179 This analysis would necessarily change if North Korea were to engage in acts of aggression
against the United States. If North Korea were to attack the United States, a military response would be
justified as an act of self-defense. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. In this situation, the appropriate level of force
would still be governed by the requirement of proportionality. See generally I. C.J. Advisory Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 143. A nuclear strike on North Korea
would justify a conventional military response and might even justify a nuclear response; however, the use
of nuclear weapons by the United States in response to a conventional attack would not be justified under
international law. Id. These situations, however, are distinct from the problems posed by the doctrine of
preemptive strike, because there is an attack upon which to evaluate proportionality. Id.
U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
l The exhaustion of peaceful remedies is closely related to the requirement of necessity under the
Caroline Doctrine. See Smith, supra note 16, at 480. As a result, the Bush Administration's failure to
exhaust peaceful remedies further cautions against the use of force on the Korean Peninsula as being
unnecessary or, at minimum, premature.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Korea. As the United States refuses to negotiate with North Korea, 82 the
situation on the Korean Peninsula has escalated to the point that North Korea
is no longer a party to the NPT, has expelled IAEA inspectors, and is
restarting nuclear facilities at Yongbyon that had been frozen since 1994
under the Agreed Framework. 183 Although diplomacy would not necessarily
resolve this problem, it seems illogical, especially considering the stakes, not
to attempt to negotiate an Agreement that would resolve the security
concerns of the United States and North Korea. 84  In any event, the use of
force without exhausting all peaceful remedies is not permitted under
international law. 185
B. The U.N. Charter's Limitations on the Use of Force: The
Requirement of an "Armed Attack"
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for self-defense in the case of
an "armed attack."' 86 There has been debate as to whether the provision was
intended to limit the right to self-defense strictly, to allow force only in
response to an actual act of armed aggression upon another nation's
territory. 187  The explicit purposes of the U.N., to avoid the recurrence of
war and to maintain a collective security structure, suggest, however, that
the right to self-defense should be viewed narrowly-with its exercise
conditioned on the occurrence of an aggressive act.1
88
182 Laney & Shaplen, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that the United States "hardened" its stance against
dialogue with North Korea-despite ally encouragement to reach a diplomatic solution).
183 See id.
'" North Korea has, since its alleged admission, stated its willingness to engage with the United
States to resolve the current problems. Id. at 17. In making these requests for dialogue, North Korea has
actually made very few demands-it seems to be primarily concerned with gaining some form of non-
aggression pact from the United States and possibly working towards economic and diplomatic
normalization. Id. (discussing North Korea's.attempts to engage the United States, Japan and South Korea
over the past several years and the North's offer to give up its nuclear program in exchange for a
nonaggression pact from the United States).
5 Secretary of State Daniel Webster, describing what became the Caroline Doctrine, stated that
Britain had to show "that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board the 'Caroline' was
impracticable, or would have been unavailing" for force to be justified in self-defense. Kearley, supra note
17, at 346.
'86 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
187 See Scachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, supra note 29, at 120 (noting
there is some disagreement whether Article 51 has superseded the customary law right of self-defense but
suggesting this difference is narrow if "imminent attack is strictly construed"). See also Beard, supra note
29 at 567 (discussing the debate regarding the "armed attack" requirement under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter and concluding that a narrow view of self-defense is appropriate). As a result, the author asserts
that "[s]tates do not have a right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed
attack."' Id.
'm See, e.g., Scachter, The Right of Slates to Use Armed Force, supra note 29, at 1646 (suggesting
that, although not perfect, using the limitations of international institutions to justify ignoring their
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Although the Charter is not a "suicide pact,"' 8 9 Article 51 appears to
require at least some signs of preparation or planning and the intent to attack
before permitting the use of force in self-defense.' 90 In cases where self-
defense is utilized without a preceding overt act of aggression, a high burden
should rest upon the state claiming a right to self-defense to protect against
abuse.' 9' In the current nuclear crisis, North Korea has not engaged in
aggressive acts to the level that would amount to an "imminent threat" to the
United States; in fact, the Peninsula has been relatively stable since the
Armistice was signed ending the Korean War fifty years ago.192
Furthermore, North Korea has been more concerned with its own security
and national survival-Kim Jong 11 has requested that the United States sign
a non-aggression pact in exchange for North Korea's ending its nuclear
program-than with planning an aggressive war. 1
93
VI. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration
announced a right to use force preemptively against threats to U.S. security.
This policy was an attempt to deal with the increasing threat of international
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The doctrine
of preemptive strike is of questionable legality under international law,
particularly with respect to its potential application in the current nuclear
crisis with North Korea. The use of force in response to North Korea's
alleged development, acquisition, or possession of nuclear weapons does not
meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality under customary
international law allowing anticipatory self-defense. This is also true for the
use of force in response to speculative fears North Korea might sell nuclear
weapons to terrorist organizations.
Under customary international law, it is not appropriate to even
consider force until all diplomatic means have been exhausted. This
restraints will only increase insecurity). Furthermore, it is in states' best interests to maintain restraints on
force. Scachter, in Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, supra note 29, at 124.
189 Beres, supra note 18, at 263.
190 This conclusion was supported by the I.C.J. in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
'19 See VATrEL, supra note 19.
192 See OBERDORFER, supra note 1 (regarding the relative peace that has been established on the
Korean Peninsula). However, it is important to note that this stability has been maintained through the
presence of U.S. troops along one of the most heavily militarized areas in the world-ironically named the
Demilitarized Zone. Id.
193 See supra note 184 and accompanying text with regard to North Korea's request for a non-
aggression pact from the United States.
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standard has certainly not been met with respect to the Korean nuclear crisis,
considering U.S. refusal to engage in any discussions with North Korea until
it meets certain conditions. Furthermore, the preemptive use of force is not
justified under the U.N. Charter's self-defense requirement since an "armed
attack" has not occurred, nor does such an attack appear to be in the
planning stages.' 
94
Potential acquisition, possession, or sale of nuclear weapons and
violations of non-proliferation treaty obligations are not appropriate areas for
unilateral military action. If the United States asserted and exercised an
expansive right of self-defense based on its individual determination of
"threat" that is not truly imminent, a dangerous precedent would be
established. The United Nations was created with the purpose of saving
future generations from the "scourge" of war and, in doing so, established a
system of collective security. Although labeling North Korea as a rogue
regime or as "evil" is very powerful in terms of sentiment, this
characterization is without legal significance. In fact, it may even be, as one
South Korean former foreign-ministry official described the "Axis of Evil"
speech-"diplomatically wayward, strategically unwise and historically
immoral.
''195
' In fact, North Korea seems to be more concerned by the potential of U.S. aggression. See supra
note 184 and accompanying text regarding North Korean's requests for a formal non-aggression pact from
the United States; see also McCormack, supra note 153, at 17 (stating that North Korea wants an "end to
the threat of nuclear annihilation under which it has lived for longer than any other nation" due to the
United States' positioning nuclear weapons in South Korea until 1991 and the continuation of nuclear
rehearsals with South Korea at least until 1998).
195 McCormack, supra note 153, at 25 (citing Haksoon Paik, What to Do With the Ominous Cloud
Over the Korean Peace Process?, NAPSNET, Special Report, Feb. 19, 2002).
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